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 Preface 
The failure of many central banks to anticipate the 2008 global financial crisis has led to 
dramatic changes in both their policies and the tools they use, including new forms of lending, 
new regional collaborations, and experiments such as negative interest rates. It has raised a raft 
of questions about the independence of central banks and central bankers. It has also tested many 
theories previously taken for granted and requires a new multi-disciplinary approach. Cornell 
University’s Meridian 180, the Global Finance Initiative, and the Mario Einaudi for Center 
International Studies have initiated a new project to develop an innovative field of 
interdisciplinary scholarship around the politics of central banking and to bring different forms 
of expertise to the discussion of complex technical issues. 
 
With support from the Tobin Project (http://tobinproject.org/) and under the leadership of 
Professor Annelise Riles (Jack Clarke Professor of Far East Legal Studies, Cornell Law School; 
Professor, Department of Anthropology, Cornell University), the project includes a literature 
review of the state of knowledge on the politics of central banking in different social science 
disciplines. The resulting papers which focus on sociology, political science, economics, and 
law, are published as part of this International Studies Working Paper Series.  
 
Based on a nation-wide call for applicants in multiple disciplines, four graduate students - Megan 
Doherty Bea (Cornell University), Adam Hayes (University of Wisconsin), Erin Lockwood 
(Northwestern University) and Marcelo Prates (Duke University) - received one-year fellowships 
to describe the achievements and methodological advantages of their disciplines related to the 
politics of central banking, as well as to identify blind spots and limitations. In addition to 
Professor Riles, the students were mentored during the year by the following faculty:    
 
• Douglas Holmes, Professor of Anthropology, Binghamton University  
• Ravi Kanbur, T.H Lee Professor of World Affairs, International Professor of Applied 
Economics and Management; Professor of Economics, Cornell University 
• Peter Katzenstein, Walter S. Carpenter, Jr. Professor of International Studies, Department of 
Government, Cornell University 
• Jonathan Kirshner, Stephen and Barbara Friedman Professor of International Political 
Economy, Department of Government, Cornell University 
• Hirokazu Miyazaki, Director, Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies, John S. Knight 
Professor of International Studies; Professor, Department of Anthropology, Cornell 
University 
 
The four graduate students’ papers were presented and discussed during an international and 
interdisciplinary conference on Changing Politics of Central Banking 
(http://einaudi.cornell.edu). The conference, hosted at Cornell University on April 18 and 19, 
2016, brought together current and former high-ranking central bank officials from Asia, Europe, 
the United States, and New  Zealand as well as economists, political scientists, anthropologists, 
sociologists, and legal scholars It initiated a conversation between social scientists and policy-
makers about the building blocks and parameters for a new intellectual architecture for 
understanding what central banks do as an empirical matter, and what they should do as a 
normative matter.  
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Introduction 
 
Sociologists, with a few notable exceptions1, did not engage with central banking prior to the 
2008 – 2009 financial crisis. The intellectual framework that dominated pre-crisis academic 
discussions of central banking focused on technical aspects of central banking from a largely 
rationalist perspective (Hayes, 2016; Lockwood, 2016), and the bread and butter of sociology – 
in this case, the study of central banks via social structures, networks, and processes – has been 
largely omitted from this scholarship. In consequence, much of the existing literature on central 
banking has not adequately considered the implications of many social processes that surround 
and influence these technical features of central banking.  
 
Sociological research on central banking has begun to provide this important perspective. These 
studies examine how central bankers make decisions, foster credibility with financial markets 
and the broader public, and adapt to changing political environments. Central banking, as 
demonstrated by this relatively new area of research, is dependent upon social processes. 
Whether it is through discussion and debate among experts and practitioners (Abolafia, 2004, 
2010), information-gathering on the current economy via contacts in business, finance, and 
government agencies (Holmes, 2014; Riles, 2011), communicating with the public (Holmes, 
2014; Sørensen, 2015; Tognato, 2012), or coordinating messaging with the media (Velthuis, 
2015), central banking involves important relational work that cannot be supplanted by economic 
modeling. While this is something that central bank practitioners understand intuitively, it has 
been absent from much of the academic scholarship on central banking until recently.   
 
This paper provides an overview of sociological contributions to central banking research, 
revealing why this research provides an important complement to traditional central banking 
research in economics and other fields. The studies discussed here remain somewhat fragmented; 
papers do not often appear in the main disciplinary journals and cross-references remain low. 
Nevertheless, many converge around key themes related to central banks’ efforts to establish and 
maintain legitimacy with regards to their forms and functions, and I will discuss these at length 
here. Following the review, I will discuss topics well suited for further sociological research and 
highlight a range of methodological tools available to academics and practitioners.  
 
While this paper primarily focuses on work found within sociology, I also discuss several recent 
contributions to central banking literature from anthropology. Ethnographic work within the 
anthropology of finance provides a deep understanding of the various emotional and cultural 
underpinnings of financial practices and institutions, and, as will be demonstrated here, this work 
can provide insightful analysis of processes relevant to central banks. Additionally, I make 
occasional references to white papers and publications authored by central bankers, in part to 
underscore that practitioners are already thinking about many of the themes emerging from this 
relatively new area of academic research.  
 
 
                                                          
1 See, e.g. Abolafia (2004), Krippner (2007), Polillo and Guillén (2005). There was also some sociological interest 
around the creation of European Central Bank in the late 1990s (see, e.g., Dodd, 2001). Others, like Hirschman 
(1985), have explored the sociology of inflation, analyzing its social and political contexts and consequences, but 
such analyses do not focus specifically on the role of central banks.   
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Current Sociological Approaches to Central Banking 
 
Several recent analyses focus on processes used to establish and maintain legitimacy, especially 
during times of economic and political uncertainty. These studies are particularly useful for 
practitioners in terms of identifying mechanisms that shape how central banks and bankers 
engage with their networks and the broader public(s), and the ways in which this engagement is 
most successful. These studies seek to answer: How does a central bank produce legitimacy at 
both the national and international levels? Once it has established legitimacy in the eyes of the 
markets and public, how does it work to maintain credibility? These questions assume that there 
is a public to whom the central bank orients itself. Indeed, as will be discussed in the below 
sections, a central bank has its legitimacy evaluated by many publics, including various actors in 
the financial markets, the media, and the general public, at both the national and international 
levels.  
 
The Production of Legitimacy in a National Context 
 
In sociology, the production of legitimacy is seen as a collective social process (Johnson, Dowd, 
& Ridgeway, 2006).  Establishing legitimacy lends credibility and stability to the actions of the 
organizations, and grants them the power to freely conduct business. A successful legitimation 
process begins with an innovation or new idea that is locally accepted and ultimately spreads to 
other localities, garnering broad acceptance and becoming the status quo (Johnson et al., 2006). 
For a central bank, its processes and decisions need to be legitimated by its audience or it can 
risk destabilizing the financial markets. Several studies, discussed below, show that part of this 
effort to maintain legitimacy involves careful attention to the narrative used in public 
announcements and statements, most of which target a national audience. 
 
National legitimacy and narrative construction. Abolafia (2004) identified the process of 
narrative construction as a topic of sociological interest early on. In this and subsequent work, 
Abolafia focuses on the Federal Reserve and uses Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
transcripts to examine the interpretive politics involved in the development of monetary policy.  
By analyzing internal discussions, he shows how narrative is strategically used to enhance the 
legitimacy of the central bank through the internal sense-making process within the bank. 
Discussion becomes "the medium in which legitimate policy and action are talked into existence" 
(Abolafia, 2010, p. 360). Abolafia (2012) underscores that, although central bankers appear to be 
rational technocrats in the eyes of the broader public, they have a significant amount of 
interpretive power in their decision-making process. While past experience and values, as well as 
economic models and data, guide the process, “policy makers select the facts, order the facts into 
a plausible narrative, and negotiate a viable choice” (Abolafia, 2010, p. 350).  
 
Holmes (2014) further illustrates how central banks manage the economy through 
communication in his ethnography of central banks. In his view, markets serve as “a function of 
language” (Holmes, 2014, p. 29), and it is not merely technical expertise, but the use of narrative 
that enhances the credibility of the central bank. Part of the central bank’s role is to maintain (or 
restore) confidence in the economy, and the bank achieves this by developing a narrative that is 
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appropriate for the current economic conditions and successfully acknowledges concerns felt by 
market participants. The communication of this narrative to the markets and public serves as a 
mechanism through which trust and confidence in the institution are built and reinforced.   
 
The successful central bank understands its role as a signal to the markets, connecting the 
economic present to the economic future. To signal appropriately, the narrative must be the right 
one. Holmes (2014, pp. 136 - 158) details how the Riksbank worked to restore confidence in 
2009 through the careful construction of a narrative that acknowledged current economic issues 
and confidently looked to the future, while remaining tailored to its Swedish audience. Even the 
most mundane word becomes important as central banks work to signal changes to the markets 
and public. In a reflection on his experiences, Duvvuri Subbarao, former governor of the Reserve 
Bank of India, writes that markets not only demanded forward guidance to help shape market 
expectations but also “guidance on guidance” to help interpret what the central bank’s statements 
meant (Subbarao 2016, p. 41).  The need for such guidance can be witnessed in a small anecdote 
from a June 2015 press conference given by Janet Yellen, Chair of the Federal Reserve. A 
journalist from the Financial Times asked Chair Yellen if the word “gradual,” which Chair 
Yellen had used during the press conference, would become “official guidance” from the Fed 
(“Transcript of FOMC Press Conference,” 2015). This serious attention to word choice, to the 
point that a journalist used part of his limited question time to ask about one seemingly 
innocuous word, indicates that strategic, clear communication by the central banks has become 
paramount.2   
 
Cultural sociologists have focused on one particular narrative strategy used to establish 
legitimacy in the eyes of the general public: invoking national identity and culture in rhetoric. 
The idea that central bankers adopt a carefully constructed cultural narrative fits well with the 
work by Holmes and Abolafia on the highly selective rhetoric used by central bankers. In direct 
contrast to studies arguing that technical expertise and rationality are the primary ways central 
banks ensure legitimacy, these studies take the position that credible monetary policy depends on 
how the bank shapes its identity in relation to its national audience (Tognato, 2012; Sørenson, 
2015). Using case studies of the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the 
Bundesbank, Tognato (2012) explains how banks strategically connect their institutional identity 
to the national identity. In Germany, for instance, average citizens came to view the 
Deutschmark as a symbol of renewed confidence in their nation following World War II. 
Tognato (2012, p. 44) cites Otmar Issing, former chief economist at the Bundesbank, as saying 
the currency filled the “‘emotional vacuum’” that Nazism left behind. The Bundesbank itself, as 
the guardian of the currency, took on an increasingly important symbolic role and became seen 
as an institution that could help Germany move on from the past. This symbolism, Tognato 
argues, connects the central bank to the broader political and economic identity of the country, 
deepening public support for the institution.   
 
Sørensen (2015) builds on Tognato’s cultural approach in a case study of the Danish central bank 
that traces the historical development of the bank’s narratives over a 150-year time-span. As a 
result of narrative development that was explicitly linked to the national identity, Sørensen writes 
that the “idea that central bankers serve the nation … was institutionalized and came to define 
                                                          
2 Chair Yellen responded by saying that she believed the use of the word “gradual” during the press conference was 
consistent with the “spirit” of the corresponding sentence found in the FOMC statement.   
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the frame within which Danish central bankers, in general, were evaluated in public discourse” 
(2015, p. 20). This symbolic connection to the national identity is maintained through constant 
reaffirmation of the central bank’s intentions and motivations. While Sørensen supports 
Tognato's theory that an appearance of rationality is insufficient for successfully implementing 
monetary policy, he also asserts that a successful narrative can be difficult to identify given the 
many varying values and norms that define the role(s) of the bank. His analysis of how the 
Danish central bank sought to connect itself to the national culture underscores the fact that 
narrative construction and legitimation-seeking are reciprocal processes, and achieving the right 
narrative requires constant fine-tuning. Furthermore, unlike Tognato, who views central banks as 
primarily reactive to national culture, Sørenson’s perspective emphasizes how central bankers 
can reproduce and change their institutional environment.  The ability to influence the broader 
environment is an important consideration and will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section.  
 
The studies discussed so far demonstrate that there is a separation between the external 
technocratic, rational appearance of central banks and the actions that are conducted internally to 
maintain that reputation. This is an idea well supported by sociological theory around the 
operation of organizations (see, e.g., Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Internally, central bankers work to 
craft a compelling narrative that both fits the current economic conditions and supports their 
rational image. With the right narrative, they can be viewed as rational, technocratic experts on 
monetary policy externally. The separation from a strict technocratic process within the bank 
through discussion and debate around policy options allows central banks to conduct important 
interpretive work that is necessary for establishing external institutional legitimacy.  
 
This process isn’t free from politics. The construction of the narrative involves “micro politics” 
around the framing of issues and policy within the central bank (Fligstein, Brundage, & Schultz, 
2014). Those around the table have backgrounds in different schools of economic thought, 
varying experiences and opinions, a combination that can add tension and increase debate over 
policy directions. During times of heightened uncertainty, the narrative process can endure 
increased conflict and negotiation about how to best shape the account – at the same time that the 
narrative becomes critically important for restoring confidence in the economy.  
 
As an example, Abolafia’s (forthcoming) work analyzing the Federal Reserve’s response to the 
2007 - 09 financial crisis demonstrates the potential sense-making failures that came with the 
increased uncertainty during the early months of the crisis. Discussing how the Fed failed and 
when it succeeded in the months following the crisis, Abolafia argues that the narrative framing 
the Fed first employed in response to the crisis was insufficient to handle the problems the 
economy was facing. At least initially, the Fed relied on a “restoration” narrative that did not 
include the possibility that the crisis could spread beyond the subprime mortgage market.3 The 
restoration narrative is connected to the efficient markets hypothesis, with the premise that 
                                                          
3 Abolofia (chapter 2, p. 5) observes that there was some debate about this narrative; Yellen voiced concerns about 
the possibility of contagion. However, he writes that there was “a tendency [among other members] to minimize the 
contagion narrative,” which he argues resulted from the fact that this alternate narrative did not fit with existing 
frames for thinking about the problem.   
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markets could heal themselves. Additionally, Abolafia argues that they made decisions under the 
problematic assumption that the financial markets and the real economy were distinct spheres 
where contagion from one to the other was an unlikely outcome.  
 
Ultimately, Abolafia argues that this initial narrative was based on – and limited by - existing 
epistemic frames that were used by central bankers. This is supported by Fligstein et. al (2014), 
who demonstrate through their own analysis of FOMC transcripts that the economic training and 
the models used limited the FOMC’s capacity to understand the size and scope of the problem 
they were facing. This example of epistemic failure is something that has been echoed in broader 
conversations about the crisis acknowledging that existing intellectual paradigms were 
inadequate and limited the responses and actions by key players. In her latest book, Gillian Tett 
(2015) warns of the dangers of siloed thinking: not only can intellectual rigidities contribute to 
an unawareness of risks, but they can also limit opportunities for the development of new ideas 
and new ways of problem-solving. This is precisely what occurred within the Fed during the 
early stages of the crisis.  
 
Did this early, flawed narrative framing lead to a decrease in the external legitimacy of the Fed? 
Not necessarily. Because their roles were so public, with significant attention from the media, 
Rosenhek (2013) argues that both the Fed and the ECB became seen as crucial actors and were 
granted the epistemic authority to act, despite early missteps. Furthermore, Rosenhek describes 
how the Fed and the ECB were able to adapt, albeit slowly, so that by the end of 2009 both banks 
were reassessing dominant epistemic narratives and coming up with alternatives. While they may 
have been slow to identify alternatives, in the end, they did move beyond their initial narrow 
framing of the crisis. 
 
The Production of Legitimacy as a Transnational Political Process 
 
So far, the discussion has focused on how the central bank can establish legitimacy within its 
national boundaries. Abolafia, Holmes, and Tognato focus their work on case studies of 
particular banks, which presume national audiences, just as Sørensen’s analysis of the Danish 
central bank used the Danish economy as a frame. These studies focus on how the central bank 
synthesizes and analyses economic data to frame policy and the ways in which the bank 
communicates those policies to the national public. But legitimacy is not dependent solely on the 
national audience.  
 
Transnational political processes. The global diffusion of central bank structure and practices has 
led to cross-national similarities in central banking. In one of the few quantitative studies of 
central banking in sociology, Polillo and Guillén (2005) argue that international pressures due to 
globalization have played a significant role in how states have dealt with monetary policy. 
Conducting a longitudinal analysis of the adoption of central bank independence, the authors 
confirm that states become more likely to emulate central bank forms found in other countries as 
their exposure to the global economy increases. Central banks also tend to share similar technical 
processes. Setting the short-term interest rate to target inflation with the aid of the Taylor Rule is 
common practice, and pursuing price stability functions as a primary goal for many central banks 
(The Group of Thirty, 2015; Lebaron 2012). 
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These similarities are indicative of the presence of a broader epistemic culture that guides many 
central banking practices. Knorr Cetina (2007) introduces the concept of “macro-epistemic 
culture” to describe a cultural framework that extends beyond national boundaries. The global 
financial architecture, in her view, is one such example. This epistemic system provides common 
tools and strategies, and it serves as a way to “safeguard the economic system” (Knorr Cetina 
2007, p. 368). The epistemic culture may have created a certain kind of central banker, what 
Lebaron (2012) considers universal paradigm of central banking, defined by similar professional 
training and transnationally supported strategies and practices heavily influenced by 
neoliberalism and monetarism. In her ethnography of public and private financial regulatory 
practices, Riles (2011, p. 126) describes the ways in which the “high degree of intellectual 
inculcation in neoliberal economic and political theories” shaped how Bank of Japan officials 
conducted their work and engaged with market participants. Following a series of highly public 
corruption scandals, the Bank of Japan imposed strict rules on how its regulators should conduct 
business with market participants, replacing the informal, yet effective, conversations that 
allowed deeper personal relationships with market interlocutors (Riles, 2011, pp. 124 – 130). 
This solution limited coordination between the markets and the central bank, and in many ways, 
made it more difficult to gather information, but it was seen as better aligned with Western 
ideologies around how a central bank should regulate.   
 
Undoubtedly, the transnational adoption of form and practice is not without its own set of 
politics; international pressures are often met with resistance from national contexts within which 
the central bank operates. As an example, Krampf (2013) describes the highly political process 
linked to the adoption of the liberal norm that supported central bank independence. He writes 
between 1940s and the 1970s, there were two norms for central banks – the liberal norm, which 
supported central bank independence from the political cycle and government oversight as a way 
to have efficient markets, and the developmental norm, which provided broader supervisory 
powers to the central bank as a way to administrate the allocation of resources.  Initially, both 
norms were accepted as legitimate forms of central banking styles. The developmental norm 
drew support from economists at the Federal Reserve due to the success of the Bank of 
Argentina’s redesign in the 1930s, which incorporated broad supervisory powers. Following this 
successful redesign, economists at both the Fed and the IMF worked to extend the developmental 
norm to other developing countries.  However, in the 1980s, there was a shift in the views of 
Western economic experts, who began to argue that market-based central banking should also 
extend to developing countries. A publication written by two scholars in the IMF’s central 
banking department seemed to solidify this shift, and the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s gave 
the IMF the opportunity to impose the adoption of liberal norm (Krampf 2013).  
 
International social structures. Central banks, as part of the global financial architecture, are 
responsive to that epistemic culture. The above example demonstrates how majority consensus 
around best practices can foster international pressures that override national preferences 
regarding central bank practices. While the above literature demonstrates how central banks are 
embedded within this culture, other work in sociology and anthropology reveals how central 
bankers also have the ability to change aspects of that culture by serving as their own epistemic 
community, defined as networks of experts with shared values and belief systems working 
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toward common policy goals (Haas, 1992). As part of an international network of financial 
actors, central bankers can reshape national discourses and influence how economic institutions 
are developed (Fourcade, 2009; Kapstein, 1992). 
 
In 1992, political economist Ethan Kapstein wrote that central bankers were increasingly 
becoming an epistemic community. Kapstein (1992) asserts that in order to be an epistemic 
community, central bankers must have consensus around and make regulatory policies based on 
established theoretical and empirical research rather than national ideologies, and that they need 
to be protected from domestic pressures.   
 
There is an argument to be made that central bankers form such a community today, especially 
post-crisis. On Kapstein’s point about consensus around policy options, central bankers 
increasingly share the same professionalization, with most holding PhDs in economics from 
prestigious (Western) schools (Hirschman & Berman, 2014; Lebaron, 2012). This shared training 
provides both a common doctrinal framework for thinking about economic issues (Lebaron, 
2012). Indeed, in a recent New York Times op-ed¬, Paul Krugman makes the observation that 
policy positions, including those within central banks, are increasingly dominated by MIT-
trained economists, beginning to supplant the Chicago school free-market ideology that was once 
prevalent. As both economists and policy makers, central bankers have “wide latitude to set the 
course of monetary policy based on accepted economic theories” (Hirschman & Berman, 2014, 
p. 793), especially because many central banks are – at least in theory – outside the scope of 
legislative oversight (Rosenhek 2013; Prates 2016).4   
 
While national political pressures have not disappeared, the spread of central bank independence 
and broad consensus around key issues demonstrates that much of their work is guided by such 
internationally supported norms. Add to this their epistemic authority around monetary policy 
issues (Rosenhek, 2013), and individual experts at the helms of central banks have become part 
of an influential, global monetary policy network. The changing guest list at the annual 
Economic Policy Symposium at Jackson Hole provides a brief, but clear demonstration of this. 
Always an event targeted to central bankers, the meeting, hosted by the Kansas City Fed, has 
increasingly excluded private financiers to add more foreign central bankers to its guest list over 
the past thirty years, encouraging participation from the global network of central bankers.5   
 
Being a part of an epistemic community does not mean that each central bank and banker needs 
to act in exactly the same way. National mandates differ, and central banks can still be subject to 
pressures from national political bodies. Importantly, shared academic ideas can have multiple 
meanings and uses once applied within the policy world (Riles 2011, p. 149). Moreover, despite 
similarities in practice, outcomes of policy can differ due to other political constraints, including 
the need to coordinate with other national institutions. But, broadly speaking, access to other 
international central bankers leads to similarities in policy measures taken, and international 
forums, like the Jackson Hole meetings referenced above, strengthen the cohesion of the 
network. Revisiting Rosenhek’s (2013) analysis on responses to the financial crisis by the Fed 
                                                          
4 Prates (2016, p. 11) astutely observes that, despite their ostensible independence, central banks can still be subject 
to legislative politics. 
5 Market participants fell from 27% of attendees in 1982 to three percent in 2013, while non-US central bankers 
increased from three percent to 31% (The Economist, 2014). 
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and the ECB underscores that, despite differences in their institutional histories and the ways 
their roles were defined, the similarities in their assessments of the crisis are striking – the same 
arguments were made, the same theories referenced.  He writes:  
 
“This certainly reflects the operation of a tight and highly institutionalized 
international network of central banks that serves as an institutional space 
for consultation, exchange of information, and the formulation of common 
ideational networks to make sense of the economic world.” (Rosenhek, 
2013, p. 269) 
  
As the crisis unfolded, key central banks continued to coordinate both formally and informally, 
enacting emergency measures together. This cooperation, Rosenhek argues, fostered shared 
causal accounts to explain the crisis, which strengthened central banks’ abilities to speak with 
authority about the crisis. Their causal interpretations evolved as the crisis deepened, and they 
began to rethink existing intellectual frames that had narrowed the range of policy options. 
While sociology often emphasizes the embeddedness of economic within broader social 
structures (Granovetter, 1985), studies on central banking demonstrate that these institutions 
serve as their own field of knowledge, capable of changing broader economic and social 
structures and norms. As an influential global network, central bankers have an opportunity to 
challenge existing intellectual paradigms. In Rosenhek’s assessment, it took an extreme 
economic shock to change how central bankers thought about their roles in the economy. Does 
epistemic change require such an extreme event? Holmes (2014) takes the premise that central 
bankers are constantly conducting “communicative experiments” as they work to improve 
monetary policy measures. Per Holmes, this is part of their daily, performative work and can 
unfold without a crisis, though perhaps more gradually.  
 
Performative Work  
 
In recent years, a significant portion of the scholarship in the sociology and anthropology of 
finance has focused on performativity of markets. Callon (2006, p. 7) defines performativity as a 
theoretical discourse "that contributes to the construction of the reality that it describes." 
Economic theories and formulas do not just describe economic phenomena but can be used to 
construct a world that matches what the theories envision. Past research has described how 
economic actors control the economic environment through performativity, using formal 
economic models and techniques to transform empirical phenomena to match what models 
anticipate (Healy, 2015). This work focuses primarily on how economic and finance theories 
contribute to the practices and conditions of the market.6  
 
There has been criticism that work on performativity tends to focus too heavily on calculative 
processes, ignoring political factors and relationships among financial actors that also shape 
economic action (Fligstein & Dauter, 2007). Others point out that this work does not sufficiently 
explore what happens when economic theories and knowledge fail (Miyazaki & Riles, 2007). 
                                                          
6 Studies in the social studies of finance, for instance, have shown how financial models can shape activity in 
financial markets (see, e.g., Lepinay, 2011; MacKenzie, 2008).   
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Recent studies on central banking begin to address such criticisms by both providing a view of 
performativity that is connected to such political and relational factors and showing how 
performative work by central bankers may risk undermining their goals in some contexts. 
 
Performativity and central banking. For central banking, there are two aspects of performativity. 
First, economic theory can shape development of the central bank’s form and practices. For 
instance, while the central bank, as an institution, seems at odds with neoliberal perspective of 
free markets, it has come to link itself to the neoliberal environment within which it is embedded 
(Krippner, 2007; Lockwood 2016). Krippner (2007, p. 482) draws on the work of sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu to argue that neoliberalism, as a discourse, can reshape institutions to support its 
prevailing theories. Similarly, Krampf (2013, p. 22) argues that it was a “discursive change” in 
economic theory that made liberal norm the sole legitimate norm during the 1980s. In this case, 
Krampf shows that dominant economic theory can restrict what “legitimate” means in terms of 
institutional structure. 
 
Other work has examined how economic theories and tools can sometimes constrain the activity 
of central banks, undermining their objectives. The paper by Fligstein et. al (2014), discussed at 
the beginning of this review, provides an example of how economic models can lead to 
performative failure within a central bank.  In their analysis of the Federal Reserve’s response to 
the financial crisis, they argue that the economic models and discourse that the FOMC used to 
make sense of the economy actually “inhibited” the ability of the FOMC to accurately respond to 
the crisis (Fligstein et. al, 2014, p. 48). The FOMC was continually underestimating the size of 
the problem due to an overreliance on models that did not match reality, which ultimately led to 
a “major failure of economic forecasting” (Fligstein, et. al, 2014, p. 49).   
 
The second aspect of performativity ties central bank rhetoric to market changes. Holmes (2014) 
shows that the rhetoric of central bankers is performative, strategically used to shape the 
behavior of markets. Holmes writes that central bankers are aware of their performative power 
and the potential impact they can have on the markets. Communication serves as a signal about 
the economic future, but it also shapes that future. This performative work can be successful if 
the central bank has become legitimized in the eyes of its public and the financial markets. 
Through “carefully calibrated” statements that are supported by data and theory, the banks’ 
statements can serve as “analytic bridges” to the future (Holmes, 2014, p. 30). Furthermore, by 
involving the public and making their actions more transparent, central banks allows the market 
to do part of its work for them (Krippner, 2007).  For instance, the use of forward guidance and 
regular communication with the public provides the market with signals about likely monetary 
policy measures, and the conditions under which those measures will be introduced, which 
allows markets to anticipate and adjust their behavior. Sørensen (2015) notes that the 
performativity of central bankers’ rhetoric is not a new phenomenon, even though studies have 
tended to focus on recent examples. In his historical analysis of the Danish central bank, which 
begins in 1840 and continues to the present, he observes how time and again, central bankers 
used rhetoric to achieve monetary policy goals.  
 
Performativity in this second sense – bringing the market in line with central bank goals via 
specific rhetoric – is difficult to achieve, and unsuccessful central bank communications can 
provide cautionary tales of what happens when performative rhetoric fails. While central banks 
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strive to guide the markets, they run the risk of having their words misinterpreted, or worse, 
experiencing a loss of confidence that makes financial actors less likely to respond to such 
communications. Central bank rhetoric must be constantly adjusted and reassessed to account for 
unanticipated market reactions. This performative work, as Holmes (2014) writes, is 
collaborative and experimental, developed in concert with the public the central bank seeks to 
guide. As an example, Holmes (2014, p. 51) details the “performative apparatus” used by the 
Federal Reserve Bank that generates both social and cultural knowledge about the economy via 
ongoing communication with a broad network of interlocutors in business and finance around the 
country. While the public serves as the central bank’s audience - the recipient of its narrative - it 
also helps shape that narrative and remains a vital participant in this performative experiment.  
 
Blinder et al. (2008) observe that there are significant variations in communicative practices of 
central banks, making it hard to determine best practices, and the authors ask whether there is an 
optimal strategy for central bank communication. As can be seen from the above literature, there 
may be no optimal strategy; the effectiveness of central bank communication is dependent upon 
a variety of national and international contexts, changing attitudes and expectations of market 
participants, and the multiple – at times conflicting – norms and values fundamental to central 
bank practices.  
 
This research on the performative work of central banking not only provides a deeper 
consideration of what performativity is and how it manifests in settings beyond trading floors, 
but it also illuminates the specific social, political, and historical contexts under which 
performative rhetoric works – and doesn't. Further research examining what happens when 
performative rhetoric of central banks does not work would begin to answer some of the 
criticisms raised more generally about the role of performativity in economic life, and, at the 
very least, bring attention to performativity’s heterogeneous forms. Moreover, studying the 
unintended consequences, and how this performative work changes as economic uncertainty 
increases, particularly as central banks seek to introduce new “unconventional” measures, would 
provide central bankers with further insights about potential pitfalls as they continue this 
communicative experiment.  
 
Epistemic Authority and Relational Work 
 
To change how they conduct monetary policy, or indeed, reframe the broader epistemic 
environment, central banks must be able to maintain authority and credibility. In economic 
sociology, Fligstein (1996, 2001) introduces a political-cultural approach to the study of markets. 
Fligstein makes the explicit argument that, in light of the many unknowns in the market 
economy, the orientation of action is shifted towards the creation of stable markets via 
cooperative action in order to achieve economic ends. His work pays special attention to political 
economy and the role of the state, institutions, and norms, highlighting how actors and 
institutions have the capacity to change the market.  
 
Applying his theory to the role of central banks in the market, it is clear that central banks must 
rely on cooperation from market participants, as well as support from political actors, to maintain 
their authority. Central bank legitimacy and credibility can always be brought into question, 
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especially in times of crisis when it may be forced to take unorthodox measures. As central 
banks work to stabilize the market in times of uncertainty, they risk losing credibility if new 
measures do not work or are not politically supported.  
 
The central bank encounters added difficulty for this task because it speaks to multiple 
audiences. A recent paper in the International Journal of Central Banking by researchers at 
Danmarks Nationalbank notes that research on central bank communications often assumes that 
the “public” means financial markets, but this is problematic because it ignores the significance 
of the broader public (van der Cruijsen, Jansen, & de Haan, 2015; see also Blinder et. al,  2008). 
The economy has become increasingly reliant on financial activity, and average citizens have 
growing exposure to risk embedded within financial markets (Fligstein & Goldstein, 2015; 
Krippner, 2005, 2011). As such, while the specifics of central bank decision-making around 
interest rates might go unnoticed by these individuals (van der Cruijsen et al., 2015), many are 
aware that the outcomes can impact their daily lives (Davidson, 2015). As a result, central banks 
must target their communications to both active market participants and the broader public in 
order to maintain their credibility.  
 
Similarly, new research has shown that the media is essential to central banks’ efforts to maintain 
order in the market (Velthuis, 2015). To maintain credibility, especially when implementing new 
ideas or practices, central banks rely on the media to convey their communications to the broader 
public. In his recent ethnographic study, Velthuis (2015) illuminates the contentious role of the 
media when it comes to central bank communication. Both the central bank and the media aim to 
manage the market with words but have conflicting interests in doing so. Central banks seek to 
ensure that the media relays the right message, but journalists have capacity to reinterpret 
narratives before relaying them to the public. In addition to this potential loss of control over the 
narrative, Velthuis (2015) argues that journalists want to capitalize on any discovery of possible 
uncertainty, while, as Abolafia (2012) notes, central banks want this uncertainty obscured in 
order to maintain their authoritative image, a tension which results in a need for a delicate 
balance between the desires of the media and those of the central banks. Media outlets remain an 
important intermediary between the central bank and the general public, but to my knowledge, 
they have not been given a place within central banking research prior to this work by Velthuis.  
 
The maintenance of epistemic authority depends on the cooperation of the various publics 
interested in – and affected by – central bank processes. Much of the work of a central banker is 
relational, defined by sociologist Viviana Zelizer (2012, p. 149) as the “creative effort people 
make establishing, maintaining, negotiating, transforming, and terminating interpersonal 
relations.” Central banking involves intentional efforts to preserve and strengthen relationships 
with other market actors, the media, and the general public. Through this work, central bankers 
can help establish boundaries and norms for economic policy and activity, while also reinforcing 
their credibility and authority. 
 
A Perspective Late to the Conversation   
 
It is unfortunate that much of the sociological interest in central banking only emerged within the 
last five to ten years. Studies of central banking found in sociology and anthropology literatures 
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provide an important assessment of the relational labor and the social, cultural and political 
tensions that shape central bank operations, contributing a perspective that challenges the 
traditional technocratic view.  
 
As the above review outlines, the sociological perspective of central banking details how central 
banks’ forms and functions become legitimated via intentional efforts by central bankers to 
connect their work to both prevailing economic theories and cultural frames that resonate with 
their audiences. These studies note the importance of both national and international influences 
and epistemic frameworks when it comes to internal decision-making processes and external 
communication. Within this literature, scholars have also analyzed how central bankers have the 
capacity to alter the financial markets through the strategic use of performative rhetoric. Finally, 
these studies have begun to show that central banks rely on collaboration with many actors and 
institutions, including other central banks, in order to maintain their authority and credibility. 
This work importantly underscores that central banks’ influence over markets is a process, not a 
stagnant form, in need of constant adjustment and reevaluation by both central bankers, as they 
set policy, and markets and the general public, as they react to policy. There are implicit politics 
and risks in each step, and this literature highlights the subjectivity and ambiguity that surrounds 
the technocratic image of the central bank.  
 
At this juncture, however, this work stands on the periphery of central banking research. With 
most publications occurring only very recently, this is not yet a cohesive, established area of 
sociological study, and studies remain somewhat isolated from one another. Going forward, there 
needs to be a concerted effort to prevent this new sociological attention from being short-lived. A 
few recent papers (Fligstein et. al, 2014; Rosenhek, 2013) signal sociological interest specifically 
around central banks’ management of the financial crisis, and this should not become the only 
way that sociology engages with central banking. As seen in this review, sociological attention to 
the routine relational work carried out by central banks is critical for developing a 
comprehensive understanding of the world of central banking, both in times of crisis and in times 
of relative stability. 
 
Implications for Future Research  
 
This work has not yet reached its full potential. Research coming out of sociology, in particular, 
tends to rely too heavily on analysis of publicly released documents, which likely offers versions 
of central banking processes that are too polished. Expanding this work to consider different 
sources of information and data, via collaboration with central bankers or other means, must be a 
part of the research moving forward. Additionally, much of this work considers central banks in 
the US and Europe. Future research needs to assess how central banks operate under different 
mandates and how different national contexts change the ability to coordinate internationally. 
This work tends to focus primarily on decision-making around monetary policy, perhaps in part 
because this is where the information is most readily available. There are a variety of other issues 
to consider – ones that stand to gain a great deal from sociological analysis. In the below section 
I discuss three possible future directions for such research, though there are undoubtedly many 
others. Before concluding, I make note of the methods and tools available that could expand and 
strengthen the existing literature.  
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A need for the study of central banking beyond monetary policy. The literature reviewed in this 
paper focuses primarily on decision-making and communicative measures regarding monetary 
policy. However, central banks are also responsible for large infrastructural projects that support 
the global economy and ensure financial stability. One potential area for consideration is central 
bank involvement in the development and maintenance of payment systems. The longstanding 
Committee of Payment and Market Infrastructures at the Bank for International Settlements, with 
25 central banks as members, underscores the significance of such issues for central banks. A 
2003 report by this committee7 raises questions around the precise roles of central bank money 
in international payment systems and individual central bank policies converge and diverge 
(Bank for International Settlements, 2003). Subsequent reports by the BIS and others continue to 
grapple with issues around harmonization of market infrastructures.   
 
The focus on technical collaboration and harmonization among banks for this and other 
infrastructural projects resonates with much of the work found in the multidisciplinary social 
studies of finance, which examines the socio-technical aspects of finance.  Within the social 
studies of finance, scholars have examined how derivatives traders interact with and innovate 
new technical products and processes (Lepinay, 2011), how financial concepts seep into the life 
views of market participants in the face of unknowns (Miyazaki, 2013), and how seemingly 
mundane technical and legal processes become highly political (Maurer, 2012; Riles, 2011).   
 
Indeed, Riles (2011) specifically draws out the political implications of technical legal processes 
within central banking. Her discussion of the Bank of Japan’s introduction of a real time gross 
settlement (RTGS) system highlights both the international political pressures that were felt by 
the BOJ to adopt such a system and the policy uncertainty that such a radical change can 
introduce, despite initial dreams of a having such a system serve as an elegant regulatory 
resolution.  Despite this example, however, most of the emerging sociological literature has 
barely scratched the surface when it comes to the infrastructural projects of central banks. 
Deeper consideration of the technical and infrastructural work of central banks would move the 
sociological literature beyond the study of monetary policy and provide opportunities for 
scholars interested in the social studies of finance to contribute to academic conversations about 
other aspects of central banking. 
 
A need for the study of social consequences of central banking policy. For sociological work that 
continues to examine monetary policy, there must be more attention given to its consequences. In 
his examination of the politics around inflation in Latin America, sociologist Albert Hirschman 
(1985) discusses both the causes and consequences of inflation, concluding his analysis by 
noting how it can redistribute wealth, favoring some groups over others, and even change state 
regime structures. His argument takes into account the full life cycle of inflation. In contrast, the 
studies presented here talk at great length about the construction of monetary policy, focusing on 
how central banks make decisions and the variety of political and social factors that must be 
considered, but they do not discuss the social consequences of monetary policy.  
 
This is a critical gap; as the economy becomes increasingly reliant on finance, such 
consequences must be considered. Indeed, this is something that central bankers themselves are 
studying. Bernanke (2015) notes in a recent Brookings Institute blog post that monetary policy – 
                                                          
7 Known as the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems at the time. 
15 
 
quantitative easing in particular – affects the distribution of wealth but that whether the net effect 
is positive or negative remains unclear. These remarks were linked to an event at the Brookings 
Institute in June of 2015 featuring three papers that sought to determine whether monetary policy 
action affected the broader economic inequality in the United States. These papers showed that, 
while unemployment was lowered and housing prices increased, there remained uneven 
distributional effects, with some regions most affected by the crisis benefitting the least from 
quantitative easing.8   
 
Sociology, with its considerable attention to economic and social inequality, is well suited to take 
on this issue, but thus far, studies have stopped short of assessing the relationship between 
monetary policy and economic inequality. The study of monetary policy and inequality is 
particularly challenging because it is difficult to separate the effects of monetary policy on 
inequality from fiscal measures and other economic events occurring simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, this research is critical as central bankers work to refine and rethink their processes 
and goals. Mechanisms of how and why monetary policy contributes to inequality must be made 
clear in order to understand how to make appropriate adjustments.  
 
A need for the study of the central banking community. Lastly, studies of central banking thus 
far within sociology and anthropology tend to focus on case studies of individual central banks, 
or compare and contrast a few different banks. The interest in these studies lies primarily in the 
internal processes and external communications of the bank that are targeted to national 
audiences. However, there is much to be said about the network of central banks and bankers 
more broadly. Future analyses should move beyond the operations of a single bank to consider 
the operations of the central banking community as a whole. Central bankers look both within 
and outside their national parameters to identify appropriate courses of actions, consulting with a 
wide range of experts formally and informally. By studying the broader network structures we 
can better assess how central bankers come to alter their methods of decision-making and actions 
they choose to take. How do central bankers connect to each other? When do they collaborate 
with other public officials and organizations within the private sector? How do meetings and 
events targeted to central bankers allow for the exchange of new ideas and signal broader shifts 
to each other?  
 
In her study on the development and influence of economic knowledge, Fourcade (2009, p. 260) 
makes specific mention of the importance of international relationships when it comes to central 
banking. While central banks aim to retain independence from national political pressures 
regarding their decision making processes (Lockwood, 2016), it is worth considering what this 
independence means when they are part of a much larger epistemic community that may in fact 
define how such independence is construed.    
 
Sociology and anthropology can speak well to community structures and cultures. Studying both 
informal and formal connections among central banks and composite groups, such as the BIS 
and the FSB, and various meetings and summits would illuminate how, when, and why central 
bankers collaborate. Incorporating analysis of these relationships would enable scholars to assess 
how central bankers signal changes to each other not just the market, and how new ideas become 
validated in the international context. At the same time, there also needs to be a more critical 
                                                          
8 See http://www.brookings.edu/events/2015/06/01-inequality-and-monetary-policy for details on this event. 
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assessment of happens when there are divides among bankers and conflicting approaches to 
global financial matters. Examining collaboration and cooperation among central banks must 
also seek to unmask key differences and debates that shape specific modes of engagement.  
 
Methodological Tools Available 
 
The fields of sociology and anthropology have the methodological tools necessary to strengthen 
and expand on existing research on central banking. Social network analysis is surprisingly 
underrepresented in the research thus far. Broadly speaking, social network analysis allows for 
the study of social structures through the analysis of social connections at either the interpersonal 
organizational levels. This analysis contributes to our understanding of how shared cultural 
meanings are produced (Pachucki & Breiger, 2010) and how similarities among persons or 
groups emerge and are reinforced (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Social sequence 
analysis, similarly, is a group of techniques that has the capacity to explain sequential social 
processes, connecting network information to specific events (Cornwell, 2015).  
 
These techniques can help interested researchers understand how networks form, are maintained, 
and how they change. Furthermore, they can trace the development of the community over time, 
mapping changes onto external events and shifts in the broader economy. Studying these 
relationships in greater detail would add to the understanding of how national and transnational 
processes of central bank legitimacy intersect. Lebaron (2012) is one of the few studies discussed 
here that uses network analysis to determine what the field of central bankers looks like and how 
they are connected to one another. There is much more work that could be done using this set of 
analytical tools.   
 
Text analysis can also identify changes within the international community. Topic modeling, a 
form of text analysis that involves algorithms to identify thematic patterns within texts, is 
particularly useful in identifying narrative shifts in responses to external shocks and evaluating 
changes over time. Fligstein et al. (2014), use topic modeling in their assessment of the Fed’s 
reaction to the 2008 – 09 financial crisis. This type of text analysis can be used to examine other 
documents, public statements and transcripts. As central banks become more open about many of 
their processes, much more of their work is publicly available, which is helpful for researchers.  
However, research efforts must also move beyond official documents and other publicly 
available information on central banking networks and activities. Qualitative research is required 
to understand the complexities facing central bankers. Ethnography and periods of extended 
fieldwork, as Riles (2011, p. 13) notes, provides scholars of finance with an opportunity to move 
beyond the “stylized and glossy accounts of their activities for outside consumption.” If this 
paper has confirmed anything, it is that central bankers work extremely hard to communicate a 
polished narrative. The public documents available are going to consist of well-vetted language 
that has been approved by various internal departments. If researchers only examine public 
documents or focus on data driven analysis using what is publicly available, we risk only getting 
part of the story. To get the rest of the story, it is critical to think more creatively about how to 
best approach central banking research.  
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Conclusion: A Need for Collaboration 
 
While the aim of this paper has been to introduce practitioners and scholars to the sociological 
study of central banking, it also shows that this work provides an essential perspective for 
understanding the social and political complexities of the central banking world. A question to 
consider moving forward is: how can sociological and anthropological work on the subject 
become a standard part of the conversation?  
 
This scholarship risks being limited in its effectiveness by not being shared with practitioners 
and other scholars outside the discipline. Too frequently, papers are not being disseminated 
across disciplines. Moreover, much of this work is hidden within academic journals, many of 
which, quite frankly, are unlikely to be picked up by central bankers, which limits its usefulness. 
Krippner (2007, pp. 483 - 486), for example, includes a four-page primer on how monetary 
policy operates before beginning her argument about how central banking sought to match 
broader neoliberal values in the late twentieth century. This is immensely helpful for readers 
unfamiliar with monetary policy, but it also signals that her audience, readers of Theory and 
Society, likely does not consist of central bank practitioners.  
 
The papers in this compendium (see Hayes, 2016; Lockwood, 2016; Prates, 2016) begin to 
demonstrate that the study of central banking can and should draw upon multiple disciplines and 
that findings can resonate across disciplines. In the conclusion of her book on the dangers of silo 
mentalities, Gillian Tett (2015) argues that there must be a willingness to allow different 
interpretations to be a part of the broader discourse in order to break down barriers between 
specialties. By actively, intentionally engaging in collaborative scholarship, we can seek to avoid 
the siloed thinking that Tett (2015) warns against. An interdisciplinary approach to the study of 
central banking – one that includes analysis and consideration of the many legal, technical, 
social, and political factors involved in central banking – would result in a more comprehensive 
understanding of the challenges central banks face and provide space for new, innovative 
solutions.   
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